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Th[e] ... rule [prematurity] was satisfactory in a day when the sentence
imposed by the court was served in full. In this day of more enlightened
penology, the rule will not work. It fails to take into consideration the
modem usage of the indeterminate sentence, the fixing of the term by
trained penologists after a study of the prisoner, the good conduct statutes
and the more liberal use of supervised parole and probation.5 7
These factors provide persuasive reasons for relaxing the requirement of
prematurity. But they alone do not compel such a result. It is likely the influ-
ence of federalism has probably also had its effect. There can be little doubt
that the integrity of the state judicial systems has suffered as a result of en-
croachment by the federal courts on the finality of state judgments. Herein,
perhaps, lies the overall answer-pride rationalized by practicality may be
prompting the states to regain ground previously lost to the federal courts.
Alan . Mogilner
QUALIFICATION OF FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS
New Hamp." Rev. Stat. Ann. Ch. 305-A (1965)
A recently-enacted New Hampshire statute requires foreign partnerships
desiring to do business within the state to "qualify" by applying to the secretary
of state for a certificate of authority.' The state now demands virtually the
same qualification procedure of partnerships as it requires of foreign corporations
and may have provided a lead which other states will follow. The statute requires
both initial registration and annual maintenance fees 2 The foreign partnership
must maintain a registered office and appoint either the secretary of state or
an individual resident or qualified corporation as its agent for the service of
process within the state.3
A foreign partnership may not maintain any action in the New Hampshire
courts until it follows the specified procedure, but its contracts within the state
are not made invalid. In addition, the attorney general may bring an equitable
57 Landreth v. Gladden, 213 Or. 205, 222, 324 P.2d 475, 483 (1958).
1 NE. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 305-A:2 (Supp. 1965).
2 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 305-A:1 (Supp. 1965), which provides in part:
Every foreign partnership desiring to do business within this state, shall pay a regis-
tration fee of fifty dollars and an annual maintenance fee of twenty-five dollars to the
secretary of state on the first business day of April following the date of registration
and on the first business day of April thereafter and continuously maintain in this
state: (a) a registered office which may or may not be the same as its place of business
in the state; and (b) a register agent, which agent may be the secretary of state and its
successor or successors in office, or an individual resident in or a corporation authorized
to do business may act as such agent in this state....
8 Ibid.
4 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 305-A:4 (Supp. 1965) which provides:
Failure to comply with the registration provision of this chapter shall not affect the
validity of any contract with such partnership; but no action shall be maintained or
recovery had in any of the courts of this state by any such foreign partnership so long as
it fails to comply with the requirements of this chapter.
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proceeding to restrain the partnership from transacting further business in the
state, and fines up to $500 may be levied.5
Comparison of "Qualification" and "Long-Arm" Statutes
Statutes which a state may use to control organizations doing business within
its borders are of three basic types. They may be of the "qualification" type,
the "long-arm" type, or may exist as a hybrid, having some of the features
of both. The New Hampshire statute appears to be of the latter class, and as
a result, confusion may arise in its application.
Qualification statutes are the means states first employed to obtain jurisdiction
over foreign corporations. Jurisdiction under such statutes is obtained by the
prior consent of the foreign corporation., Typically, they provide that as a
condition precedent to doing business in a state, the corporation must "qualify,"
i.e., register, with the secretary of state. In its application the corporation
must either designate an agent within the state upon whom process may be
served, or consent to service upon the secretary of state.7 Such statutes have
been passed by every state.8
When first enacted, qualification statutes were principally attacked as being
violative of the privileges and immunities and the interstate commerce clauses
of the Constitution.9 The Supreme Court, in Paul v. Virginia,'0 held that since
a corporation was not a "citizen" within the meaning of the privileges and
immunities clause, it could not claim the protection which that clause afforded."
The Court has consistently followed this decision.1 2 Objections based on the
commerce clause were overruled if the foreign corporation was not engaged
solely in interstate commerce.'8
5 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 305-A:3 (Supp. 1965).
6 The jurisdiction obtained may be narrow or broad. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1314 allows
a resident of New York to bring an action against a foreign corporation regardless of where
the cause of action arose. In contrast, N.Y. Ins. Law § 59 requires a foreign insurer to
consent to New York jurisdiction only for causes of action arising out of "contracts de-
livered or issued for delivery" within New York.
7 See 1 CCH, Corp. Law Guide ff 810 (1962), which sets out the statute of each state.
Corp. Trust Co., What Constitutes Doing Business 13-33 (1965) gives excerpts from the
statutes of each state and the comparable statutes of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Alberta,
British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince
Edward Island, Quebec, Saskatchewan, and the Yukon Territory. Comment, "'Doing Busi-
ness': Jurisdiction, Qualification and Taxation Applications," 11 U.C.L.AL. Rev. 259-65
(1964), traces the history and development of these qualification statutes.
8 1 CCH, Corp. Law Guide I[ 700, at 2421 (1963). The statutes of 45 states and the
District of Columbia deny an unregistered foreign corporation recourse to their courts to
enforce contracts made within the state in intrastate business. Corp. Trust Co., supra note
7, at 5.
9 Pembina Consol. Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 184 (1888); Henn,
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, § 100, at 127 (1961); Comment, "'Doing
Business': Jurisdiction, Qualification and Taxation Applications," 11 U.CLJAL. Rev. 259,
270-74 (1964); Note, 47 Cornell L.Q. 300, 301 (1962).
310 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
11 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868).
12 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71, 89 (1928);
Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112, 126 (1912); Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg,
204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907); Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S.
373, 374-75 (1903).
13 Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, 268 U.S. 325, 335 (1925) (license fee
unconstitutional as applied to company doing purely interstate business); Sioux Remedy
Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 202-03 (1914); International Textbook Co. v. Peterson, 218
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By comparison, long-arm statutes theoretically provide a different basis for
jurisdiction over the corporation. Unlike qualification statutes, they are not based
upon actual consent to jurisdiction. Long-arm statutes were first interpreted
as meaning that by doing business within a state a foreign corporation had
given its "implied consent" to be bound by the jurisdiction of that state's
courts.' 4 More recently, the act of transacting business within a state has been
found, by itself, sufficient to establish the jurisdictional basis, and the implied
consent fiction has been largely abandoned.' 5
There are very real differences between the effects the two types of statutes
may have on a nonresident. A qualification statute is more burdensome. Papers
must be filed and a fee must be paid. Access to the state's courts may be
temporarily or permanently barred to a corporation which has failed to meet
its requirements. In some states contracts entered into before qualification are
void. 16 Because of the more burdensome nature of qualification statutes, a
foreign corporation must be doing more business to be forced to qualify than
is necessary to authorize service under the long-arm statutes.' 7
Whether the New Hampshire statute is meant to be a qualification or a
hybrid statute is unclear. The title and most of its provisions seem to indicate
that it is intended only to be a qualification statute. But in section 305-A: 6 it
provides that when a foreign partnership transacting business in the state has
failed to qualify as required, the secretary of state is deemed to have been
authorized by the partnership to serve as its agent to receive process. Further-
more, New Hampshire has no long-arm statute applicable generally to individuals.
The state has made such statutes applicable only to foreign corporations, 8
nonresident motorists,' 9 and insurers. 20 If New Hampshire has any long-arm
statute enforceable against the individual members of a foreign partnership,
therefore, it must necessarily be found in chapter 305-A.
Long-arm intent may also be found in the interpretation the New Hampshire
courts have placed upon their statute requiring qualification of foreign corpora-
US. 664 (1910) (per curiam) ; International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 94 (1910);
International Text Book Co. v. Tone, 220 N.Y. 313, 318, 115 N.E. 914, 915 (1917).
It has been recently suggested that the state's police power may be used to require even
corporations engaging in entirely interstate business to qualify. See Henn, supra note 9,
§ 93, at 116; Comment, "'Doing Business': Jurisdiction, Qualification and Taxation Appli-
cations," 11 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 259, 270-71 (1964). Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc.,
366 U.S. 276 (1961), by dictum, makes this questionable. Citing the first International Text-
book case with approval, the Court said: "It is well established that New Jersey cannot
require Lilly to get a certificate of authority to do business in the state if its participation
in this trade is limited to its wholly interstate sales to New Jersey wholesalers." Id. at 278.
14 Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 21 (1907); Connecticut
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 614 (1899); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350,
356 (1882).
15 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945); see Notes, 47 Cornell
L.Q. 273, 274-75 (1962); 44 Ore. L. Rev. 131, 133-34 (1965).
16 See 1 CCH, Corp. Law Guide, ff 820 (1962), listing at least four states with such a
provision.
17 International Text Book Co. v. Tone, supra note 13, at 318, 115 N.E. at 915; Corp.
Trust Co., supra note 7, at 1-2; Henn, supra note 9, § 93, at 116. For a statute which has
both long-arm and qualification features, see Cal. Corp. Code § 15700. In Lewis Mfg. Co. v.
Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d 245, 295 P.2d 145 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956), where the statute
was construed, it was unnecessary to classify it either as a long-arm or a qualification statute.
Is N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 300:11(c) (1955).
19 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 264:1 (1955).
20 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 406:2 (1955).
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tions. The corporate-qualification statute was probably used as a model for
the new act, since the form and wording of the statutes are virtually identical. 21
Section 300:11(c), very similar to section 305-A:6, has been given a long-arm
interpretation. 22
Thus, the statute's application is in doubt. Is the provision applicable only to
foreign partnerships which have done sufficient business to be required to
qualify but which have failed to do so? Or, is it available as an independent
long-arm statute to submit foreign partnerships doing sufficient business to
authorize substituted service (but not enough to be forced to qualify) to the
personal jurisdiction of the New Hampshire courts?
The Privileges and Immunities Clause: Corporations as "Citizens"
A "citizen" is protected by the privileges and immunities clauses of the
Constitution23 and of the fourteenth amendment from unreasonably discrimina-
tory state laws operating against nonresidents because of their status as such.2 4
A nonresident "citizen," by being forced to qualify under the threat of fine or loss
of access to the state's courts, dearly experiences discrimination because of
his status as an alien in the state. This seems to have been recognized by the
Supreme Court, at least impliedly, in Paul v. Virginia 5 and more recently in
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-on-Drugs, Inc.
2 6
Since an individual cannot constitutionally be excluded from doing business
within a state, a state may not condition his entrance upon his having qualified.
A corporation, on the other hand, is viewed for this purpose as an entity apart
from its individual stockholders. It is not entitled to the protection of the
privileges and immunities clause because it is not a "citizen" within the
meaning of that clause.2 7 It may be completely prevented from doing intrastate
business if the state so desires.2 8 A state may, therefore, prohibit a corporation's
entrance until it has met any reasonable conditions the state desires to impose.29
A qualification statute is such a condition. The New Hampshire statute now
includes general partnerships as businesses which the state may exclude
entirely or admit subject to compliance with qualification requirements. The
21 See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 300:3, 300:4, 300:7, 300:10, 300:11, 300:12, 300:13 (1955),
300:15 (Supp. 1965) ; Note, "Qualification of Partnerships," 24 Corp. 3. 267 (1965), dealing
also with the New Hampshire statute discussed in this Note.
22 Benson v. Brattleboro Retreat, 103 N.H. 28, 30, 164 A.2d 560, 562 (1960); see Note,
7 N.H.BJ. 208 (1965).
28 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.
24 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281,
295-96 (1920); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 248-49 (1898). See 16 Am. Jur. 2d
"Constitutional Law" § 468 (1964).
25 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). For a compilation of cases following Paul, see 12 Am.
Jur. "Constitutional Law" § 453, at 101 n.10 (1938 and Supp. 1964).
26 366 U.S. 276 (1961). See also Guerin Mills, Inc. v. Barrett, 254 N.Y. 380, 385, 173
N.E. 553, 555 (1930).
27 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868); Pilgrim Real Estate, Inc. v.
Superintendent of Police, 330 Mass. 250, 252, 112 N.E.2d 796, 797 (1953).
28 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22, 26 (1937); Pembina Consol. Silver
Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 185 (1888); Paul v. Virginia, supra note 27, at 181.
29 See Henn, supra note 9, § 93, at 115 n.4 (1961) for a list of conditions upon entrance
which are "unreasonable." These include agreements not to resort to federal courts and
conditions which would violate a corporation's right to due process or equal protection
of the laws.
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procedure demanded of partnerships is virtually identical to that required of
corporations. 30
Whether the New Hampshire statute will be held constitutional would seem
to depend to a large extent upon whether or not a partnership will be viewed
as an (entity" apart from its individual partners or as an "aggregate" composed
of them. If viewed as an entity, it would probably be denied the protection of
the privileges and immunities clause; if viewed as an aggregate composed of
its partners, it would probably be entitled to the protection of the clause. Both
state common law and the Uniform Partnership Act3 l may indicate the manner in
which a federal inquiry into the fundamental nature of a partnership might
be resolved.
At common law, a partnership was viewed as an aggregate composed of its
members and not as a legal entity.32 But the Uniform Partnership Act casts
a different light on the nature of a partnership. Under the act, a partnership is
considered to be an entity for certain purposes3 and an aggregate for others.3 4
Thus the act would seem to furnish little assistance in deciding the fundamental
constitutional question. It does not deal with the qualification issue.a5 Any
attempt to frame an argument that the act's basic intent was to adopt either an
entity or aggregate approach could probably be met with equally strong
counter-arguments.38
Most of the earlier decisions in the state courts attempted to delineate a
partnership as an entity or aggregate for all purposes.3 7 Later, the states began
to realize that a partnership was incapable of being logically grouped among any
of the then-existing business types. Instead a separate body of law developed,
which treated a partnership as either an entity or an aggregate, depending upon
the particular purpose for which the classification was made.38
30 See note 21 supra.
31 The act has been adopted in 41 jurisdictions and is applicable to most of the more
than one million partnerships in the United States. Mersky, "The Literature of Partnership
Law," 16 Vand. L. Rev. 389, 390-91 (1963).
82 X-L Liquors, Inc. v. Taylor, 17 N.J. 444, 454-57, 111 A.2d 753, 759 (1955) (dictum);
1 Rowley, Partnership § 1.3, at 15 (2d ed. 1960); Jensen, "Is a Partnership Under the
Uniform Partnership Act an Aggregate or an Entity?" 16 Vand. L. Rev. 377 (1963); Note,
27 Tenn. L. Rev. 304, 305 (1960).
33 The following sections of the UPA contain references to a partnership as an entity:
2, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 35(1) (b), 40(a) (H), 40(h)-(i).
Jensen, supra note 32, at 379. See also Note, 27 Tenn. L. Rev. 304, 306 (1960).
34 The definition of a partnership in § 6(1) and the exclusion of the right to sue and
be sued in its own name reflect the aggregate view. Jensen, supra note 32, at 379. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, §§ 701-11(c) recognizes a partnership as an aggregate for income tax pur-
poses. Caplin, "Income Tax Pressures on the Form of Business Organization: Is It Time
for a 'Doing Business' Tax?" 47 Va. L. Rev. 249, 251 (1961).
85 It could be argued that the act's basic definition of a partnership in § 6, excluding
any "association ... formed under . . . authority . . . other than the authority of this
state" as a partnership, expressly excludes any consideration of foreign partnerships from
its scope; see Note, "Qualification of Partnerships," 24 Corp. J. 267, 269 (1965).
36 Although the original intent of the committee which framed the act was to consider
the partnership as an entity, a split among the draftsmen resulted in a compromise. Crane,
"Twenty Years Under the Uniform Partnership Act," 2 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 129, 132 (1936).
87 Jensen v. Wiersma, 185 Iowa 551, 552, 170 N.W. 780 (1919); Caswell v. Maplewood
Garage, 84 N.H. 241, 249, 149 Adt. 746, 751 (1930) ; Dunbar v. Farnum, 109 Vt. 313, 320-21,
196 Atl. 237, 240 (1938) (on reargument); 1 Rowley, supra note 32, § 1.3, at 15-17; Note,
47 Iowa L. Rev. 1159 (1962).
38 Mazzuchelli v. Silberberg, 29 N.J. 15, 21, 148 A.2d 8, 11 (1959); Hartigan v. Casualty
Co. of America, 227 N.Y. 175, 178-79, 124 N.E. 789, 790 (1919).
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As the states began to extend their regulation to other forms of businesses,
the Supreme Court began to place less emphasis upon the formalistic question
of whether or not the particular enterprise should be considered a "citizen" for
purposes of application of the privileges and immunities clause. In Hemphill v.
Orloff,39 the Court announced a new idea: "Whether a given association is
called a corporation, partnership, or trust, is not the essential factor in deter-
mining the powers of a state concerning it. . . . If clothed with the ordinary
functions and attributes of a corporation, it is subject to similar treatment." 40
In that case a Michigan statute included all "associations, partnership associa-
tions and joint stock companies having any of the privileges of corporations,
not possessed by individuals or partnerships .... 2,41 within the term "corpo-
rations" and required them to qualify. The Supreme Court found it constitutional
as applied to the defendant, which was a "Massachusetts" or "business" trust.42
The court in Hemphill defined its test for deciding if a business should be
classified as a corporation as whether it has the "ordinary functions and
attributes of a corporation." The fact that the trustees were elected in biannual
stockholders' meetings, were exempt from personal liability, and were authorized
to distribute the proceeds of operations to stockholders in their discretion
indicated to the court that the trust was similar to a corporation." It apparently
considered only the "internal affairs" of the business, not concerning itself with
the "external appearance" a business may present within a state. In deciding,
under this approach, whether a foreign partnership can be required to qualify,
it seems irrelevant whether it does the same amount of business within a state
as a foreign corporation or has an equal number of offices and agents. The states
have followed the Hemphill approach.44
The New Hampshire statute seems to go much further than the Michigan
statute considered in Hemphill. It requires all partnerships to qualify, regardless
of whether they have "any of the powers or privileges" of corporations. Since
a partnership is vitally different from a corporation4 5 in many of the aspects
the Supreme Court seems to consider determinative, an extension of Hemphill
would seem required in order to uphold the New Hampshire Act.
The State Police Power
Recent Developments. Lately, foreign unincorporated associations, partner-
ships, and individuals have been increasingly regulated by state statutes. Regu-
89 277 U.S. 537 (1928).
40 Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 550 (1928).
41 Mich. Comp. Laws § 9071 (1915). It is inteiesting that this law categorized "partner-
ships" with individuals while including "partnership associations" with corporations. The
present Michigan law, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.94 (1963), requires only a corporation to qualify.
4 Hemphill v. Orloff, supra note 40, at 544.
48 Id. at 545-48. Precisely why the court considers the internal structure controlling has
not been elucidated. Comparison of the internal structure of corporations and partnerships
has also been made in applying diversity of citizenship tests for federal jurisdictional ques-
tions. See Comment, 50 Va. L. Rev. 1135 (1964). In that setting, the test seems more rational.
44 See the tests applied in Reisig v. Associated Jewish Charities, 182 Md. 432, 34 A.2d
842 (1943) (unincorporated membership association compared with corporation); State St.
Trust Co. v. Hall, 311 Mass. 299, 41 N.E.2d 30 (1942) (business trust compared with
partnership); Opinion of the Justices, 266 Mass. 590, 165 N.E. 904 (1929); Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 155 Ohio St. 116, 98 N.E.2d 33 (1951), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 342 US. 437 (1952) (corporation compared with Philippine sociedad
anonima).
45 E.g., individual liability of partners, absence of shareholders, death as terminating
business, method of distribution of partnership proceeds.
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lation, and even exclusion, of foreign security brokers and dealers46 liquor
salesmen,47 and insurance agents48 has been upheld.49 These regulations have
been justified as valid exercises of the state police power. Perhaps the New
Hampshire qualification statute could be similarly justified. But this is at
least doubtful, since the regulations held constitutional seem to have been
designed to prevent a much larger danger to the residents of a state than would
be presented by an ordinary business partnership doing a small amount of
business.
If a partnership were found to be within the protection of the privileges and
immunities clause, a balancing of a state's power to regulate under its police
power against the protections the Constitution affords to "citizens" would
seem to be necessary.50 Discrimination against the nonresident seems slight
since the inconvenience and burden on the foreign partnership is relatively
small; the registration procedures involve only minor technical requirements
and the fees are minimal. The rationale often used to sanction long-arm statutes
could easily be extended to this area: if a partnership desires to take advantage
of a state's facilities it ought to be willing to answer complaints concerning
business conducted there.51
Exclusion as a Means of Reguation Under the Police Power. As previously
noted, a state may be able to compel a foreign partnership to qualify as a
reasonable means of regulation under its police power, even if the partnership
is considered a "citizen" protected by the privileges and immunities clause.
However, the New Hampshire statute not only requires a foreign partnership
to qualify but also provides that one which has failed to do so may be excluded
from the state.52 Use of the state police power to exclude, rather than to place
reasonable regulations upon the conducting of a business, seems less justified.
In Flexner v. Farson,53 the Supreme Court, in speaking of the defendant
partnership, said: "The State had no power to exclude the defendants . ... 54
Although this decision has been criticized,5 9 the criticism has been of its long-
arm ramifications. One such critic said:
In suits against foreign corporations substituted service of process may be
imposed as a condition to admission to do business within the State; the
46 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Henn, supra note 9,
§ 93, at 116 n.9 (1961).
47 Rippey v. Texas, 193 U.S. 504 (1904).
48 La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919); 12 Am. Jur. "Constitutional Law"§ 463, at 116 (1938).
49 It should be noted that all these occupations are ones which contain a potential of
great harm to the citizens of a state. Further, in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.
of America, 359 US. 65, 68-69 (1959), the Supreme Court stated: "the regulation of
'insurance,' though within the ambit of federal power ... has traditionally been under the
control of the States."
50 For suggestions that "balancing" in this field is in order, see Henn, supra note 9, § 93,
at 116; Comment, 11 U.CL.A.L. Rev. 259, 270-71 (1964). But see Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Sav-on-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
51 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, supra note 46, at 626; Sugg v. Hendrix, 142
F.2d 740, 743 (5th Cir. 1944); Oro Nay. Co. v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 2d 884, 892,
187 P.2d 444, 449 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Note, 45 Calif. L. Rev. 93, 97 (1957).
52 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 305-A:3 (1965). Such exclusion is brought about by an
equitable proceeding instituted by the Attorney General.
53 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
54 Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289, 293 (1919).
55 See Culp, 'Trocess in Actions Against Non-Residents D.oing Business Within a State,"
32 Mich. L. Rev. 909 (1934).
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State has power to admit or exclude on such terms as it sees fit. The
Flexner case can be taken simply as a denial that non-resident individuals
may be excluded from doing business on the same basis. In other words, the
non-resident individual has rights of doing business within the State,
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, which the foreign corporation does
not have.56
The distinction which this critic has made is exactly the one which New
Hampshire seems to have blurred. Although reasonable regulation through the
police power may perhaps be justifiable, total exclusion must stand on a
different footing. To deny totally the right of an individual, or of a group of
individuals, to enter a state is a more serious burden than to allow them to
transact business under reasonable regulation. A state could justify the latter as
a reasonable use of its police power to provide its residents with a convenient
forum. But to justify the former on the basis of state police power, it seems that
the state's interest would have to be more substantial than the mere convenience
of its residents.
CONCLUSION
New Hampshire has passed a statute requiring virtually the same qualification
procedure of foreign partnerships as it demands of foreign corporations. The
statute is also probably intended to function as a long-arm statute-in light of
the interpretation which the New Hampshire courts have given to their corporate
statute and in the absence of any other applicable long-arm statute.
The chief constitutional objection to the statute is that it denies partnerships
the protections of the privileges and immunities clause. That clause is not
applicable to corporations. If a partnership is defined as an entity, as is a
corporation for this purpose, the partnership would similarly be denied its
protection. A partnership is no longer classified as either an entity or aggregate
for all purposes, especially where the Uniform Partnership Act has been adopted.
Rather than decide the issue as a matter of labels, the Supreme Court, if it
were to rule in such a case, would probably compare the internal structure of
a partnership with that of a corporation to determine if a partnership is entitled
to the protection of the privileges and immunities clause.
Even if it should be decided that a partnership is protected by the Constitution,
reasonable regulation by a state through its police power would still seem
possible. Such regulation seems justified if it reasonably regulates business
within the state. However, to completely exclude a foreign partnership which
has not complied with this regulation is a severe abridgement of individual
rights, and the protection such a regulation would afford the residents of a
state is probably less significant than the rights sacrificed in gaining it.
James R. Sweeny
56 Id. at 919-20. [Footnotes omitted.]
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